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I. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. R. 85. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0') (Supp. 2002) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction over "orders, 
judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not 
have original appellate jurisdiction"). 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented is whether the trial court erred in refusing to compel 
arbitration, despite the existence of a written arbitration agreement executed on April 3, 
2001, and contrary to the provisions of the Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-
31a-4 (repealed effective May 15, 2003), mandating that "[tjhe court, upon motion of any 
party showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to 
arbitrate." R. 9-31; 85-87. 
The standard of review is one of correctness, giving no deference to the legal 
conclusions of the trial court. This Court has held, "As a general rule, whether a trial 
court correctly decided a motion to compel arbitration is a question of law which we 
review for correctness, according no deference to the trial judge." Central Florida 
Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Associates, 2002 UT 3, f^ 10, 40 P.3d 599. 
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III. 
DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations are determinative 
or important to the resolution of this appeal. 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-3 (repealed effective May 15, 2003). 
A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to 
arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds 
existing at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged 
as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3la-4(l) (repealed effective May 15, 2003). 
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an 
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is 
raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of 
the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those issues 
and order or deny arbitration accordingly. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6.5. Definition of heir. 
As used in Sections 78-11-7, 78-11-8, and 78-11-12, "heirs" means: 
(1) the following surviving persons: 
(a) the decedent's spouse; 
(b) the decedent's children as provided in Section 75-2-114; 
(c) the decedent's natural parents, or if the decedent was adopted, then his 
adoptive parents; 
(d) the decedent's stepchildren who: 
(i) are in their minority at the time of decedent's death; and 
(ii) are primarily financially dependent on the decedent. 
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(2) "Heirs" means any blood relative as provided by the law of intestate succession 
if the decedent is not survived by a person under Subsections (l)(a), (b), or (c). 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7. Death of adult-Suit by heir or personal 
representative. 
Except as provided in Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation Act, when 
the death of a person not a minor is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another, his heirs, or his personal representatives for the benefit of his heirs, may 
maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death, or, if such 
person is employed by another person who is responsible for his conduct, then also 
against such other person. If such adult person has a guardian at the time of his 
death, only one action can be maintained for the injury to or death of such person, 
and such action may be brought by either the personal representatives of such adult 
deceased person, for the benefit of his heirs, or by such guardian for the benefit of 
the heirs as provided in Section 78-11-6. In every action under this and Section 
78-11-6 such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may 
be just. 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12. Survival of action for injury to person or death 
upon death of wrongdoer or injured person—Exception and restriction to out-of-pocket 
expenses. 
(l)(a) Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the person or death caused 
by the wrongful act or negligence of another do not abate upon the death of the 
wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured person or the personal 
representatives or heirs of the person who died have a cause of action against the 
wrongdoer or the personal representatives of the wrongdoer for special and general 
damages, subject to Subsection (l)(b). 
(b) If prior to judgment or settlement the injured person dies as a result of a cause 
other than the injury received as a result of the wrongful act or negligence of the 
wrongdoer, the personal representatives or heirs of that person have a cause of 
action against the wrongdoer or personal representatives of the wrongdoer only for 
special damages occurring prior to death that result from the injury caused by the 
wrongdoer, including income loss. "Special damages" does not include pain and 
suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and other not readily quantifiable damages 
frequently referred to as general damages. 
(2) Under Subsection (1) neither the injured person nor the personal 
representatives or heirs of the person who died may recover judgment except upon 
competent satisfactory evidence other than the testimony of that injured person. 
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6. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3 (Supp. 2002). Definitions. 
(10) "Health care" means any act or treatment performed or 
furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any 
health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the 
patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement. 
(14) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any 
action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach 
of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged 
personal injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or 
which should have been rendered by the health care provider. 
(20) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a health care 
provider, under a contract, express or implied. 
7. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17(b) (Supp. 2002): 
the [arbitration] agreement shall require that 
(i) one arbitrator be collectively selected by all 
persons claiming damages; 
(ii) one arbitrator be selected by the health care 
provider; 
(iii) a third arbitrator be jointly selected by all 
persons claiming damages and the health care 
provider from a list of individuals approved as 
arbitrators by the state or federal courts of 
Utah. . . . 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendants/Appellants Richard M. Rosenthal, M.D., Gregory P. Stevens, 
M.D. and IHC Health Center - Holladay (hereinafter "Health Care Providers") moved to 
compel arbitration of Plaintiff/Appellee's (hereinafter "Baker") claims based on the 
existence of a written arbitration agreement and the provisions of the Utah Arbitration 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3la-4 (repealed effective May 15, 2003), mandating that "[t]he 
court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall 
order the parties to arbitrate." R. 9-31; 85-87. This appeal was brought to challenge the 
district court's ruling denying arbitration. 
Following briefing by the parties and oral argument, the trial court on May 14, 
2003, entered its ruling denying Health Care Providers' motions. R. 85. In denying their 
motions, the trial court concluded that "plaintiffs wrongful death action is separate and 
distinct from the cause of action the deceased would have had for personal injuries had he 
survived. Therefore, plaintiffs cause of action for wrongful death is wholly separate and 
distinct from any action her husband might have maintained. Furthermore, she did not 
sign the Arbitration Agreement." R. 85-86. Health Care Providers now appeal the trial 
court's legal conclusion and request that the arbitration agreement be enforced. 
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V. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are relevant to the issues presented to this Court for review. 
1. On April 3, 2001, Gary Baker, who received health care from these Health 
Care Providers, executed a written arbitration agreement. R. 35; see Addendum at p. 32. 
2. The arbitration agreement expressly specifies that the parties agree to 
binding arbitration: 
Article 1: Agreement to Arbitrate: We hereby agree to 
submit to binding arbitration all disputes and claims for 
damages of any kind for injuries and losses arising from the 
medical care rendered or which should have been rendered 
after the date of this Agreement. All claims for monetary 
damages against the physician, and the physician's partners, 
associates, association, corporation or partnership, and the 
employees, agents and estates of any of them (herein 
collectively referred to as "physician"), must be arbitrated 
including without limitation, claims for personal injury, loss 
of consortium, wrongful death, emotional distress or punitive 
damages. . . 
Arbitration Agreement, R. 35; Addendum at p. 32. 
3. The Arbitration Agreement expressly makes the spouse and heirs of Mr. 
Baker third-party beneficiaries: 
We expressly intend that this Agreement shall bind all persons 
whose claims for injuries and losses arise out of medical care 
rendered or which should have been rendered by Physician 
after the date of this Agreement, including any spouse or heirs 
of the patient and any children, whether born or unborn at the 
time of the occurrence giving rise to any claim (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as "Patient ") 
Arbitration Agreement, R. 35; Addendum at p. 32. 
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4. The Arbitration Agreement specifies that the parties waive the right to trial: 
Article 2: Waiver of Right of Trial: We expressly waive all 
rights to pursue any legal action to seek damages or an)' other 
remedies in a court of law, including the right to a jury or 
court trial, except to enforce our decision to arbitrate, to 
collect any arbitration award and to facilitate the arbitration 
process as permitted by the Utah Arbitration Act. 
Arbitration Agreement, R. 35; Addendum at p. 32. 
5. The Arbitration Agreement expressly provides for other parties to 
participate in the arbitration: 
The parties consent to the participation in this arbitration of 
any person or entity that would otherwise be a proper 
additional party in a court action and which agrees to be 
bound by the arbitration decision. Any existing court action 
against such additional person or entity shall be stayed upon 
agreement to participate in the arbitration. 
Arbitration Agreement, R. 35; Addendum at p. 32. 
6. On October 7, 2002, Baker filed a complaint as personal representative of 
the Estate of Gary Baker, for herself and the other heirs of Gary Baker, alleging medical 
malpractice against Health Care Providers relating to the death of Gary Baker on April 
1 1 O A A 1 D £ 1 i , ^uvy i . i v . \j. 
7. On December 16, 2002, Richard M. Rosenthal, M.D., moved to compel 
arbitration. R. 9. 
8. On December 18, 2002, Gregory P. Stevens, M.D. and IHC Health Center -
Holladay moved to compel arbitration. R. 22. 
9. Baker opposed the motions to compel arbitration, filing a memorandum in 
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opposition on January 15, 2003. R. 40-52. 
10. On February 3, 2003, Richard M. Rosenthal, M.D., filed a reply 
memorandum in support of his motion to stay and compel arbitration. R. 54. 
11. On February 3, 2003, Gregory P. Stevens, M.D. and IHC Health Center -
filed a reply memorandum in support of their motion to compel arbitration. R. 64. 
12. On April 9, 2003, the Honorable Claudia Laycock heard oral argument. 
R. 85. 
13. On May 13, 2003, the Honorable Claudia Laycock entered an order 
denying Health Care Providers motions based on the court's conclusion that 
plaintiffs wrongful death action is separate and distinct from 
the cause of action the deceased would have had for personal 
injuries had he survived. Therefore, plaintiffs cause of 
action for wrongful death is wholly separate and distinct from 
any action her husband might have maintained. Furthermore, 
she did not sign the Arbitration Agreement." 
R. 85-86; Addendum at pp. 29-30. 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This medical malpractice action arises out of the care provided to Gary Baker by 
Health Care Providers prior to his death on April 11, 2001. Utah Code Ann. § 78-31 a-4 
(repealed effective May 15, 2003), mandates that "[t]he court, upon motion of any party 
showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate." 
(Emphasis added.) It is uncontrovered that a written arbitration agreement to submit any 
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existing or future controversy to arbitration was executed by Gary Baker on April ?, 2001. 
The plain language of the arbitration agreement specifies that "All claims for monetary 
damages . . . must be arbitrated including without limitation, claims for personal injury, 
loss of consortium, wrongful death, emotional distress or punitive damages." R. 35. 
(Emphasis added.) The agreement further specifies that "this Agreement shall bind all 
persons whose claims for injuries and losses arise out of medical care rendered or which 
should have been rendered by Physician after the date of this Agreement, including any 
spouse or heirs of the patient and any children." R. 35. The agreement also specifies that 
the parties, "expressly waive all rights to pursue any legal action to seek damages or any 
other remedies in a court of law, including the right to a jury or court trial." Under 
principles of contract construction, Baker is bound to arbitrate all claims arising from the 
underlying health care provided to Gary Baker. Although Baker did not actually sign the 
agreement, she is bound as a third party beneficiary to the arbitration agreement, as a 
spouse of the signatory decedent, and in her official capacity as the personal 
representative of Gary Baker's estate. In addition, the arbitration agreement's waiver of a 
right to trial is a valid defense applicable to both the claims of Gary Baker and the 
wrongful death claim of Mrs. Baker and the other heirs. Finally, policy favors 
enforcement of arbitration agreements. 
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VII. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SECTION 78-31A-4(l) SPECIFIES THAT "THE COURT, UPON MOTION OF 
ANY PARTY SHOWING THE EXISTENCE OF AN ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENT, SHALL ORDER THE PARTIES TO ARBITRATE." 
The issues before this Court should be resolved in favor of Health Care Providers 
through the proper statutory interpretation of the applicable statutes. As the Utah 
Supreme Court has held: 
When faced with a question of statutory construction, we look 
first to the plain language of the statute. In so doing, [w]e 
presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and 
give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning. We will not infer substantive terms into the text 
that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must be 
based on the language used, and [we have] no power to 
rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed. 
Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 2001 UT 29, \ 12, 24 P.3d 928 
(quotation marks and citations omitted, alterations in original). Thus, each word is to be 
given effect. 
Arbitration agreements are valid and enforceable under Utah law. In The Utah 
Arbitration Act, the legislature clearly provided, "A written agreement to submit any 
existing or future controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except 
upon grounds existing at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged 
as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-3 (repealed 
effective May 15, 2003). The Act specifies that "[t]he court, upon motion of any party 
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showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3la-4 (repealed effective May 15, 2003) (emphasis added). The 
legislature crafted the Act with the clear intent that agreements to arbitrate should be 
given effect. 
In matters of statutory construction, "[t]he best evidence of 
the true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting [an] 
Act is the plain language of the Act." 
Plaits v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997) (citing State v. Hunt, 
906 P.2d311, 312 (Utah 1995);. 
By the plain language of the Act, it is clear that given the existence of an 
agreement to arbitrate and upon motion by a party, arbitration is mandatory. The use of 
the language "shall" demonstrates the intent that arbitration be mandatory. 
It is also well established that "[t]he form of the verb used in a 
statute, i.e., something 'may,' 'shall5 or 'must5 be done, is the 
single most important textual consideration determining 
whether a statute is mandatory or directory." 
"According to its ordinary construction, the term 'may' means 
permissive, and it should receive that interpretation unless 
such a construction would be obviously repugnant to the 
intention of the Legislature or would lead to some other 
inconvenience or absurdity." The term "shall," on the other 
hand, "is usually presumed mandatory and has been 
interpreted as such previously in this and other jurisdictions." 
State ex rel M.C., 940 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted). 
"The meaning of the word shall is ordinarily that of command." Herr v. Salt Lake 
County, 525 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1974). Consequently, the legislature advisedly used 
mandatory language when it provided, "The court, upon motion of any party showing the 
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existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3 la-4 (repealed effective May 15, 2003). Thus, arbitration is mandatory. 
"This mandatory language leaves no discretion to the court." Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 
19,176,5P.3d616. 
POINT II. 
THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT UNAMBIGUOUSLY SPECIFIES THAT 
CLAIMS FOR WRONGFUL DEATH BE ARBITRATED AND THAT ANY 
SPOUSE, HEIR OR CHILD IS BENEFITTED AND BOUND BY THE 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT. 
The scope of the arbitration agreement is unambiguous. The arbitration agreement 
expressly specifies that binding arbitration is the intent and bargain of the parties. The 
agreement clearly applies to all claims, including those for wrongful death: 
We hereby agree to submit to binding arbitration all disputes 
and claims for damages of any kind for injuries and losses 
arising from the medical care rendered or which should have 
been rendered after the date of this Agreement. All claims 
for monetary damages against the physician, and the 
physician's partners, associates, association, corporation or 
partnership, and the employees, agents and estates of any of 
them (herein collectively referred to as "physician"), must be 
arbitrated including without limitation, claims for personal 
injury, loss of consortium, wrongful death, emotional 
distress or punitive damages. . . 
Arbitration Agreement, R. 35; Addendum at p. 32 (emphasis added). 
It is unambiguous that Mr. Baker's spouse and heirs were intended to be within the 
scope of the agreement and that any claim arising out of the medical care at issue is 
subject to arbitration. The arbitration agreement expressly makes the spouse and heirs of 
Mr. Baker third-party beneficiaries: 
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We expressly intend that this Agreement shall bind all 
persons whose claims for injuries and losses arise out of 
medical care rendered or which should have been 
rendered by Physician after the date of this Agreement, 
including any spouse or heirs of the patient and any 
children, whether born or unborn at the time of the occurrence 
giving rise to any claim. 
Arbitration Agreement, R. 35; Addendum at p. 32 (emphasis added). 
The Arbitration Agreement specifies that the parties waive the right to trial: 
We expressly waive all rights to pursue any legal action to 
seek damages or any other remedies in a court of law, 
including the right to a jury or court trial, except to enforce 
our decision to arbitrate, to collect any arbitration award and 
to facilitate the arbitration process as permitted by the Utah 
Arbitration Act. 
Arbitration Agreement, R. 35; Addendum at p. 32. In addition, the Arbitration 
Agreement expressly provides for other parties, including Dr. Stevens, and IHC Health 
Center - Holladay, to participate in the arbitration: 
The parties consent to the participation in this arbitration of 
any person or entity that would otherwise be a proper 
additional party in a court action and which agrees to be 
bound by the arbitration decision. Any existing court action 
against such additional person or entity shall be stayed upon 
agreement to participate in the arbitration. 
Arbitration Agreement, R. 35; Addendum at p. 32 
In opposing Health Care Providers5 motions to compel arbitration, Baker relied 
largely on the Colorado Court of Appeals case, Pacheco v. Allen, 55 P.3d 141 (Colo. 
App. 2001). However, recently in Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375 (Colo. 2003), the 
Colorado Supreme Court overruled the lower court's ruling stating: "[W]e reject the 
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court of appeals' analysis and agree with the trial court that the arbitration 
agreement applies to both (1) wrongful death actions and (2) non-party spouses." Id. 
at 381 (emphasis added). Although the arbitration agreement was unenforceable on other 
grounds, the Colorado Supreme Court carefully set forth its analysis concerning the 
enforceability of the arbitration agreement against a non-signatory spouse's wrongful 
death claim. 
In Allen, as in the case at hand, the surviving spouse opposed submitting her 
claims to arbitration under an agreement signed by her deceased husband. The reasoning 
and analysis employed by the Colorado Supreme Court is informative and persuasive. 
Applying well-established principles of contract interpretation, the Colorado Supreme 
Court examined the arbitration agreement and determined that the language plainly 
applied to "any claim of medical malpractice . . . including, but not limited to, death." Id. 
at 378-79. The court reasoned, "We must construe the terms of the agreement in a 
manner that allows each party to receive the benefit of the bargain, and the scope of the 
agreement must faithfully reflect the reasonable expectations of the parties. In other 
words, we must interpret the agreement in a manner that best effectuates the intent of the 
parties." Id. at 378. 
The court then looked to the specific language of the arbitration agreement, noting 
"as we examine whether [the parties], via the contract between them, intended the scope 
of the arbitration agreement to include both (1) wrongful death claims and (2) non-party 
spouses, we must look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the agreement itself and 
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construe any ambiguities in favor of arbitration.'' Id at 378-79 (emphasis addedV 
The Allen court continued its reasoning: 
Although it is true that a wrongful death claim is separate and 
distinct from a cause of action the deceased could have 
maintained had he survived, this observation is not helpful in 
determining whether separate wrongful death claims are in 
fact included within the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
agreement. Because the plain language of the agreement in 
this case refers to "all claims" including those brought for 
"death," and because we must apply a strong presumption in 
favor of arbitration, we find that the arbitration agreement 
applies to wrongful death claims. 
Id. at 379. 
In addressing the fact that the surviving spouse had not signed the agreement, the 
Colorado Supreme Court corrected the erroneous statement of the Colorado Court of 
Appeals: 
The court of appeals reasoned that the arbitration clause does 
not apply to a non-party such as Pacheco because a non-party 
to a contractual agreement cannot be bound by its terms. 
Pacheco, 55 P.3d at 143. This statement of the law is 
inaccurate. Although it is true that in general, only the parties 
to a contract are bound by its terms, a non-party may fall 
within the scope of the agreement if the parties so intend. 
Id. at 379-80 (citations omitted). The court then held: 
Because the contract reflects the intent of the parties to bind 
claimants other than signatory members, the fact that Pacheco 
is a non-party does not by itself exempt her from the 
arbitration agreement. So long as she is within the category 
of heirs, personal representatives, or persons claiming special 
duties, she is bound by the arbitration agreement. 
Id. at 380 (emphasis added). 
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As was the case in Allen, the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in 
the arbitration agreement demonstrates that the parties' intent was to subject all claims to 
arbitration, including claims for wrongful death, and to bind the spouse and heirs to the 
agreement. 
Utah law further supports enforcing the agreement against Baker as a third party 
beneficiary. Because Mr. Baker's spouse and heirs are third-party beneficiaries to the 
agreement, it is enforceable both by and against them. "The predominant inquiry in any 
third party beneficiary case is whether the contracting parties clearly intended the third 
party to receive a separate and distinct benefit from the contract." Oxendine v. Overturf 
1999 UT 4, \ 14, 973 P.2d 417. "The intent of the contracting parties to confer a separate 
and distinct benefit must be clear." American Towers Owners Ass 'n, Inc. v. CCI 
Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah 1996). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "Whether a third-party beneficiary status 
exists is determined by examining a written contract. The issue can be decided on 
summary judgment as a question of law." American Towers Owners Ass 'n v. CCI 
Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah 1996). "If the language within the four 
corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the 
plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter 
of law." Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, f 12, 62 P.3d 440. As set forth previously, it is 
undisputed that the spouse and heirs of Mr. Baker are within the scope of the arbitration 
agreement. Moreover, it is undisputed that the scope of the arbitration includes claims 
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from wrongful death. The health care was rendered on the condition that "All claims 
based on the same occurrence, incident, or care shall be arbitrated in one proceeding." 
R. 35. Under these circumstances, it is fully consistent with fairness and contract law that 
the third-party beneficiaries to the agreement be subject to its provisions, including the 
arbitration provision. Therefore, Baker, as a third-party beneficiary, is entitled to the 
benefit of the agreement as a third-party beneficiary, and the agreement is both 
enforceable by Baker and against her. 
Other courts have enforced arbitration agreements against nonsignatories to the 
agreements for other reasons and circumstances. For example: 
In some cases, a nonsignatory was required to arbitrate a 
claim because a benefit was conferred on the nonsignatory as 
a result of the contract, making the nonsignatory a third party 
beneficiary of the arbitration agreement. In other cases, the 
nonsignatory was bound to arbitrate the dispute because a 
preexisting relationship existed between the nonsignatory and 
one of the parties to the arbitration agreement, making it 
equitable to compel the nonsignatory to also be bound to 
arbitrate his or her claim. . . . 
Appellate courts have stated that arbitration agreements are 
enforced with regularity against nonsignatories. (See, e.g., 
Mormile v. Sinclair, supra, 21 Cal. App.4th at p. 1511, 26 
Cal.Rptr.2d 725.) However, a preexisting relationship 
between the nonsignatory and one of the parties to the 
arbitration agreement is a common factor in these cases. For 
example, when a patient who agreed to arbitration brings a 
medical malpractice action against a physician, some courts 
hold that the patient's spouse must arbitrate a loss of 
consortium cause of action even though the spouse did not 
sign the arbitration agreement. (Id. at pp. 1511-1516,26 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 725; Gross v. Recabaren (1988) 206 Cal. App.3d 
771, 781, 253 Cal. Rptr. 820.). . . 
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A spouse must arbitrate a wrongful death claim when his or 
her decedent spouse applied for health insurance for both of 
them and the application contained an arbitration clause. 
{Hawkins v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal. App.3d 413, 
416-419, 152 Cal. Rptr. 491.) The wrongful death claims of 
nonsignatory adult heirs of a group health plan member must 
be arbitrated if the member agreed to arbitrate his or her heirs' 
claims. {Herbert v. Superior Court (1985) 169 Cal. App.3d 
718, 722-727, 215 Cal. Rptr. 477.) 
County of Contra Costa v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. 47 Cal. App.4th 237, 
242-43, 54 Cal. Rptr.2d 628, 631 (1996). 
Because Baker is attempting to assert claims based on "claims for injuries and 
losses aris[ing] out of medical care rendered or which should have been rendered," Baker 
must accept the burdens along with the benefits, and should be compelled to arbitrate her 
claims. It would be manifestly unjust to require otherwise. 
POINT III. 
DEFENSES AVAILABLE AGAINST THE DECEASED, INCLUDING WAIVER 
OF THE RIGHT TO TRIAL, MAY BE ASSERTED AGAINST BAKER. 
The trial court refused to enforce the Arbitration Agreement against Baker, 
asserting that "plaintiffs wrongful death action is separate and distinct from the cause of 
action the deceased would have had for personal injuries had he survived," that 
"plaintiffs cause of action for wrongful death is wholly separate and distinct from any 
action her husband might have maintained," and that, in any event, plaintiff "did not sign 
the Arbitration Agreement." R. 85-86. However, the trial court's ruling is contrary to 
Utah law. Under well-established Utah law, a wrongful death action is not entirely 
separate and distinct from the cause of action the deceased would have had for the 
18 
personal injuries had he survived. The wrongful death cause of action relates to the 
underlying wrong done to the decedent, and is subject to defenses that could have been 
asserted against the decedent. 
Although Utah courts recognize that "an action for wrongful death is an 
independent action accruing in the heirs of the deceased," Utah courts have "not entirely 
separated the heirs' right from the decedent's because the heirs' right is in major 
part based on the rights of support, both financial and emotional, that run to them 
from the deceased." Jensen v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 332 (Utah 1997) 
(emphasis added). Thus, it is well-established that: 
the wrongful death cause of action is based on the underlying 
wrong done to the decedent and may only proceed subject to 
at least some of the defenses that would have been available 
against the decedent had she lived to maintain her own action. 
Id. "As the Van Wagoner Court said, the heirs have 'a right to proceed against the 
wrongdoer subject to the defenses available against the deceased, had he [or she] lived 
and prosecuted the suit.'" Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152, 1155 (Utah 1989) 
{citing Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific R.R., 186 P.2d 293, 303-04 (Utah 1947)) (emphasis 
added). 
Interpreting a claim for wrongful death under Utah law, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has also noted: 
[E]ven though it is a separate and distinct action which arises 
on the death of the decedent, the foundation of the right of 
action is the original wrongful injury to the decedent. And it 
is essential to the maintenance of the action that the wrongful 
act or default be of such character that the decedent could 
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have maintained an action to recover damages for his injury if 
death had not ensued. While it is not a derivative action in the 
ordinary meaning of the term, recovery cannot be had unless 
the decedent could have recovered damages for his wrongful 
injury had he survived. 
Francis v. Souther Pac. Co., 162 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1947), affd 333 U.S. 445 (1948). 
Thus, defenses which could have been asserted against the decedent remain viable 
against claims for wrongful death. In this case, Gary Baker's waiver of the right of trial 
remains a viable defense. The arbitration agreement includes a specific, unambiguous 
waiver to the right to trial. 
Waiver of Right of Trial: We expressly waive all rights to 
pursue any legal action to seek damages or any other remedies 
in a court of law, including the right to a jury or court trial, 
except to enforce our decision to arbitrate, to collect any 
arbitration award and to facilitate the arbitration process as 
permitted by the Utah Arbitration Act. 
R. 35. Such waiver of the right to trial is a valid defense which remains applicable to 
Baker's wrongful death claim. 
Moreover, any claim asserted by Baker which is not part of the wrongful death 
claim would be subject to the arbitration agreement because the personal representative of 
a decedent's estate is bound by contracts signed by the decedent.1 See, e.g., In re Estate 
ofShepley, 645 P.2d 605 (Utah 1982). Thus, claims of the estate are subject to the 
Elements considered in wrongful death include: u[F]inancial support furnished; 
loss of affection, counsel and advice; the loss of deceased's care and solicitude for the 
welfare of the family; and loss of the comfort and pleasure the family of the deceased 
would have received." Oxendine v. Overturf, 1999 UT 4, ^ 19, 973 P.2d 417. Other 
claims asserted in this action would be claims of the estate. 
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arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement specifically identifies claims made by 
Mr. Baker's "spouse or heirs of the patient" as governed by the agreement. 
Consequently, this Court should enforce the Arbitration Agreement against the estate and 
all the heirs, which would encompass both those claims based on the survival statute and 
those based on the wrongful death statute. 
POINT IV. 
THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT PROVIDES FOR 
ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AGAINST PERSONS 
OTHER THAN THE PATIENT. 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act also specifically encompasses "any action 
against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful 
death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of 
health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care provider." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(15) (emphasis added.) Thus, the Health Care Malpractice 
Act's provisions concerning the enforcement of arbitration agreements against persons 
other than the patient are applicable to wrongful death claims. Section 78-14-17(b) of the 
act provides that: 
the [arbitration] agreement shall require that 
(i) one arbitrator be collectively selected by all 
persons claiming damages; 
(ii) one arbitrator be selected by the health care 
provider; 
(iii) a third arbitrator be jointly selected by all 
persons claiming damages and the health care 
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pro\ ider from a list of individuals approved as 
arbitrators by the state or federal courts of 
Utah 
The legislature expressly anticipated that arbitration agreements would encompass claims 
other than those brought by the patient such as wrongful death and loss of consortium. 
POINT V. 
THE POLICY OF UTAH LAW FAVORS ARBITRATION, 
In addition to the express language of the agreement entitling Health Care 
Providers to a stay in the proceedings in order to participate in arbitration, there exists a 
presumption in favor of arbitration. Moreover, arbitration agreements should be 
construed in favor of covering asserted disputes. The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
Arbitration is a contractual remedy for the settlement of 
disputes by extrajudicial means. It is a remedy freely 
bargained for by the parties, and "provides a means of giving 
effect to the intentions of the parties, easing court congestion, 
and providing a method for expeditions and less expensive for 
the resolution of disputes." There is a strong public policy in 
favor of such a remedy, but it should not be involved to 
resolve disputes that the parties have not agreed to arbitrate. 
Arbitration clauses should be liberally interpreted when the 
issue contested is the scope of the clause. If the scope of an 
arbitration clause is debatable or reasonably in doubt, the 
clause should be construed in favor of arbitration unless it can 
be said that it is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers 
the asserted dispute. If an arbitrable issue exists, the parties 
should not be deprived of the benefits of the agreement for 
which they bargained. 
Lindon Cityv Engineers Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Utah 1981) (quotingKing 
County v. Boeing Co.. 570 P.2d 713, 717-18 (Wash. Ct. App. (1977)). 
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The Lindon Court went on to state: "As to whether the content of a contract is 
arbitrable, doubts should be resolved in favor of the parties' freedom to contract." Id. at 
1072-73 (citing Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574 (I960)). It then 
concluded: 
There appears to be no "public policy" or other good reason 
why persons effectively and by contract, should not be able to 
agree to out-of-court settlement. It is accomplished frequently 
by stipulation, binding concessions, accord and satisfaction, 
covenant not to sue, by indemnity contract, and by other 
honorable and legal means. 
The trends toward such inter se agreements without resorts to 
litigation, reflects a good, practical way to resolve disputes. 
Id. at 1073. 
It is well established that arbitration is a contractual agreement to settle disputes by 
extrajudicial means. In fact, the Court characterized arbitration as a manner where 
"persons effectively and by contract. . . agree to out-of-court settlement." Id. 
Consequently, an arbitration award should be properly treated as another form of 
voluntary out-of-court settlement. The parties have agreed to settle their dispute through 
extrajudicial means. 
In Allred v. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass 'n of Utah, 909 P2d 1263 (1996), the Utah 
Supreme Court unanimously upheld the enforceability of the arbitration clause in the 
insurance policy and stated: 
The Act supports arbitration of both present and future 
disputes and reflects long-standing public policy favoring 
speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes. 
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Id. at 1265 (citation omitted). 
"Where the evidence relating to a purported agreement to arbitrate is undisputed, 
the district court has no discretion under the statute. It must compel arbitration." McCoy 
v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31, t 10, 20 P-3d 901 (citing Docutel 
Olivetti v. Dick Brady Sys. Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479-80 (Utah 1986)). The arbitration 
agreement should be enforced and all parties ordered to participate in arbitration of 
Baker's claims. 
As a binding contract, the arbitration agreement "is of course subject to attack only 
on the same basis as any other written agreement or contract, by showing that because of 
fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake, incapacity or other infirmity that in equity and 
good conscience it should not be enforced." Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 
1975). Indeed, "people are generally free to bind themselves pursuant to any contract, 
barring such things as illegality of subject matter or legal incapacity." Phone Directories 
Co. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, U 15, 8 P-3d 256. In this case, no ground exists to set 
aside the agreement. Even if a party may subsequently regret having entered into the 
agreement to arbitrate his or her claims, it is long-standing law that: 
Parties should be permitted to enter into contracts that actually 
may be unreasonable or which may lead to hardship on one 
side. Although courts will not be parties to enforcing 
flagrantly unjust agreements, it is not for the courts to assume 
the paternalistic role of declaring that one who has freely 
bound himself need not perform because the bargain is not 
favorable. 
Bekins Bar VRanch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted). 
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In addition, it is also the policy of the state of Utah to favor and encourage 
enforcement of arbitration agreements. Indeed, u[T]he policy of our law favors 
arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating disputes." DeVore v. IHC 
Hosp. Inc., 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 1994). Even the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized that the policy of the United States is to favor and encourage arbitration. See 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercwy Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S. Ct. 
927, 947, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1983) ("Section 2 [of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 
§ 2] is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.") 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellants Gregory P. Stevens, M.D. and IHC 
Health Center - Holladay respectfully request that the Court reverse the ruling of the trial 
court and order that arbitration agreement be enforced in this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2£%xy of February 2004. 
BURBIDGE & WHITE 
Larry R. fahite 
J"~^RU~M»*^— 
Paul D. Van Komen 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants Gregory P. 
Stevens, M.D. and IHC Health Center - Holladay 
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78-3 la-3. Arbitration agreement. 
A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to 
arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing 
at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as 
provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
78-3la-4. Court order to arbi t ra te . 
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an 
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised 
concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the 
matters covered b\T the agreement, the court shall determine those issues and 
order or deny arbitration according!}7. 
'2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration agreement 
is involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court having jurisdic-
tion to hear motions to compel arbitration, the motion shall be made to that 
court. Otherwise, the motion shall be made to a court with proper venue. 
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration sta}^s any action or 
proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement. 
However, if the issue is severable from the other issues in the action or 
proceeding, only the issue subject to arbitration is stayed. If a motion is made 
in an action or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include a stay of the 
action or proceeding. 
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not be grounded on a claim 
that an issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds for the 
claim have not been shown. 
Larry R. White (#3446) 
Paul'D. Van Komen (#7332) 
BURBIDGE & WHITE 
Attorneys for Defendants, Gregory P. Stevens, M.D. 
and IHC Health Center - Holladay 
50 South Main Street, #1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 359-7000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHPJSTTNE BAKEP., For Herself and on 
Behalf of the Heirs of GARY BAKER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREGORY P. STEVENS, M.D., RICHARD 
M. ROSENTHAL, M.D., and IHC HEALTH 
CENTER - HOLLADAY, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
COMPEL ARBITRATION 
Civil No. 020404386 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
The defendants' Motions to Compel Arbitration came before the Court for hearing 
pursuant to notice on Wednesday, April 9, 2003, at 2:00 p.m., the Honorable Claudia Laycock 
presiding. The plaintiff was represented by Craig M. Snyder. The defendant, Richard M. 
Rosenthal, M.D., was represented by Brian P. Miller. The defendants, Gregory P. Stevens, M.D., 
and IHC Health Center-Holladay, were represented by Larry R. White. The Court having 
reviewed the briefs of the plaintiff and the defendants and having heard oral argument and being 
fully advised in the premises finds that plaintiffs wrongful death action is separate and distinct 
from the cause of action the deceased would have had for personal injuries had he survived. 
Therefore, plaintiffs' cause of action for wrongful death is wholly separate and distinct from any 
action her husband might have maintained. Furthermore, she did not sign the Arbitration 
Agreement. The Court being fiilly advised in the premises and good cause therefore appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendants' 
Motions to Compel Arbitration should be and the same are hereby denied. 
DATED this _ [ § day of May, 2003. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of May, 2003,1 caused to be served by the method 
indicated below a true and correct copy of the attached and foregoing ORDER DENYING 
MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION to the following: 
VIA FACSIMILE 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
VIA U.S. MAIL 
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 
Craig M. Snyder 
HOWARD LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, UT 84603 
VIA FACSIMILE 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
VIA U.S. MAIL 
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 
Brian P. Miller 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
W \IHC\7588\0001\Order deny arbitration wpd 
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Article 1: Agreement tn Arbitrate: We hereby agree ID submit ID binding arbitration al! disputes and claims for damages of 
any kind for injuries and losses arising from the medical care rendered or which should have been rendered after the aatr of this 
Agreement. AlJ claims for monetary damages agains: the physician, and the physician's partners, associates, association, corporation 
or partnership, and the employees, agents and estates of any of them (hereinafter collectively referred ID as "Physician"), rnusr be 
arbitrated including, without limitation, claims for personal injury, loss of consortium, wrongful death, emotional distress or punitive 
damages. We agree thai the Physician may pursue a iegaJ action to collect any fee from the patienr and doing so shall not waive the 
Physician's right 10 compel arbitration nf any malpractice claim. However, following the assertion of any malpractice claim auainst 
.the Physician, any fee dispute, whether or nor the subject of any existing legal action, shall also be resolved by arbitration. 
We expressly intend thar this Agreement shall bind all persons whose claims for injuries and losses arise ou: of medical znrs 
rendered or which should have been rendered by Physician after the date of this Agreement, including any spouse or heirs of the 
patient and any children, whether bom or unborn at the rime of the occurrence giving rise to any claim (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as "Patient"). 
Article 2: Waiver of Righr of Trial; We expressly waive all rights to pursue any legal action to seek damages or any other 
remedies in a coun of law, including the right to a jury or court trial, except to enforce our decision to arbitrate, to collect any 
arbitration award and to facilitate the arbitration process as permitted by the Utah Arbitration Act. 
Article 3: Procedures and Appointment of Arbitrators: Patient shall serve Physician by certified mail with a written 
demand far arbitration which shall specify the nature Df the claim, the date of the claimed occurrence, the complained of conduct by 
the Physician, and a description of the Patients1 injuries and damages. Within 60 days after the demand, the parties shall agree upon a 
neutral arbitrator to be selected "from a list of individuals approved as arbitrators by the State or Federal courts of Utah. If the panics 
cannot agree upon a neutral arbitrator, the court shall select an individual from that list. The neutral arbitrator shall: preside over the 
arbitration hearing and pre-arbitration conferences; establish scheduling orders; supervise iht conduct of discovery to prevent abuse 
and insure efficiency and cost-effectiveness; rule on all motions, including motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss for 
failure to proceed with reasonable diligence; administer oaths; issue subpoenas; and exercise other powers granted to arbitrators In the 
Utah Arbitration Act. Within six months of the demand for arbitration or as otherwise ordered by the neutral arbitrator, Patient shall 
select one arbitrator and Physician shall select one arbitrator. Patient and Physician shall pay the fees and expenses, of his or her own 
arbitrator. Each parry snail share equally the expenses and fees of the neutral arbitrator. The panics agree that the arbitrators have the 
immunity of a judicial officer from civil liability when acting in the capacity of an arbitrator under this Agreement. 
All claims based on the same occurrence, incident or care shall be arbitrated in one proceeding: however, Patient or 
Physician shall have chs absolute right to arbitrate separately issues of liability and damage upon written request to the neutral 
arbitrator. Arbitration hearings will be held in the County of the Physician's principal place of business or elsewhere as the parties 
may agree. 
The parties consent ID the participation in this arbitration of any person or entity that would otherwise be a proper additional 
parry in a coun action and which agrees to be bound by the arbitration decision. Any existing coun action against such additional 
person or entity shall be stayed upon agreemeni to panicipate in the arbitration. 
The parries agree thai the arbitration proceedings are private, not public, and the privacy of the panics and of the arbitration 
proceedings shall be preserved. 
Article 4: Applicable Law: With respect to any matter not herein expressly provided for, the arbitration shall be governed 
by the Utah Arbitration Act All provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, with the exception of the notice of intent and 
pre-iitigarion hearing requirements which the panics hereby waive, shall apply to the arbitration. The comparative fault provisions of 
Utah law apply to the arbitration and the arbitrators shall apportion fault to all persons or entities who contributed to the. claimed injury 
whether or not they are panics to the arbitration. 
Article 5: Revocation: This Agreement may be revoked by wrinen notice mailed to the Physician, by cenified mail, within 
30 days after signature, and if not revoked shall govern all medical services received by the Patient after the date of this Agreement. 
Article 6: Term; the term of this Agreement is one year from the date it is signed. It shall be automatically renewed from 
year to year thereafter uniess cither party to this Agreement notifies the other of his or her election not to renew in writing delivered by 
certified mall prior to Lhe rcnrwal date. 
Article 7: Read and Understood; I (Patient or Patient's representative) have read and I understand the above Agreement. I 
understand that 1 have the right to have my questions about arbitration answered and J do noi have any unanswered questions. I 
execure this agreement of my own free will and not under any duress, and I understand thai I my signing this agreement is not a 
requirement in order io receive medical services from Physician. 
Article 8: Revived Copy; I have received a copy of this document. 
Article 9: Severability: If any provision of this Agreement is held invalid or unenforceable, the remaining provisions shall 
remain in full force and shall not be affected by the invalidity of any other provision. 
Richard Roseetkll, Inc. . C-P^* 6 , b ^ Y ^ 
dba.Otfffin B?A)n <£ Spine Center , , ' V ^ N a m = ofPvuaii (PrirfTT 
SignatM i^raLsitiari W (Date) Tignanlrrbf Panenfor PatienTs / ''(Date) 
By: 
Authoritiii Representative Representative 
